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Abstract: A teacher’s words reflect the theory and methods he uses. Words reveal theoretical 
structures, the problems identified as relevant, and how those problems should be analyzed.  
I investigate whether entrepreneurship-rich and institutions-rich theories are 
represented in Ph.D. programs in economics. I analyze textbooks for the presence of terms 
that fall naturally into two sets. One set deals with the knowledge and discovery: 
entrepreneur, innovation, invention, tacit knowledge, and bounded rationality. The other deals 
with social rules: institutions, property rights, and economic freedom. When the words appear 
I examine the meaning. 
I examine the textbooks used in required courses in microeconomics, 
macroeconomics and industrial organization in all Ph.D. programs in economics in Sweden. 
The investigation is not specific to Sweden, however, because Ph.D. programs in Sweden are 
virtually identical to programs in the United States. The same textbooks are used, and nearly 
all of the textbooks examined are written by economists in the United States. 
I find that (i) all programs are in the tradition of “mainstream” economics; (ii) 
by and large, the eight expressions scarcely appear in the textbooks; and (iii) when they do 
appear, their meaning is diluted or distorted, compared to their meaning in theories where the 
idea is more central. In my judgment, the results constitute powerful evidence that today’s 
doctoral programs do not train young economists to identify and analyze important economic 
issues in a relevant way.  
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 1.  Introduction 
 
  Today, many view entrepreneurship and economic freedom as the remedy for 
unemployment and low economic growth, not least in the European welfare states with 
permanently high unemployment and lagging economic growth. Economists have an 
important role to fulfill as policy advisers and civil servants. Do today’s Ph.D. programs in 
economics give researchers adequate training in analyzing questions concerning 
entrepreneurship? 
  Economics is a heterogeneous discipline with numerous traditions, each based 
on a cluster of theories. Each theory uses ideas, schemes, and assumptions. Different theories 
often give rise to opposing views on the importance of a problem, how the problems should 
be formulated, what methods should be applied, and what policy judgments to make.  
  Theories are presented in textbooks. A textbook’s index includes 
key words that indicate the structure of the theory, its method, and which problems it 
identifies as important. Words not appearing in a textbook’s index are words not important in 
the theoretical structures within the book. We get an idea of what the textbook’s theories do 
not consider to be important or have not yet captured. What is not written could be at least as 
telling as what is written.  
My purpose is to investigate whether entrepreneurship-rich and institutions-rich 
theories are part of Ph.D. programs in economics. I investigate whether key words appear in 
the index of the textbooks used in Sweden’s Ph.D. programs in economics.  
  The investigation covers all Ph.D. programs in economics in Sweden for the 
academic year 2003-04. The investigation is not specific to Sweden, however, because Ph.D. 
programs in Sweden are a lot like programs in the United States. Nearly all of the textbooks 
examined are written by economists in the United States.  The textbooks in Sweden are books 
  2familiar to Ph.D. students in the United States and elsewhere.  So the Swedish aspect of this 
investigation is inessential.  The investigation treats the dominant mainstrain style of Ph.D. 
program, regardless of where on the globe it is situated.  
The investigation covers the required courses in microeconomics and 
macroeconomics and courses in industrial organization (I/O). The required courses in 
microeconomics and macroeconomics present the theoretical foundation that everyone is 
supposed to know. Industrial organization is about industrial structure, competition, and 
development, so here especially students ought to encounter theories involving 
entrepreneurship and institutions.  
Textbooks represent received theory, while articles are developments of theory 




2. The Dual Lacunae: Entrepreneurship and Institutions 
 
The terms naturally break down into dual sets. One deals with knowledge and discovery: 
entrepreneur, innovation, invention, tacit knowledge, and bounded rationality. The other deals 
with social rules: institutions, property rights, and economic freedom.   
 
A.  Entrepreneurship 
 
In the history of economic thought, the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship have often been at 
the very center of analysis. Entrepreneurship was already discussed during Antiquity. The 
French 18
th century economist Richard Cantillon was the first to integrate the entrepreneur 
  3into economic theory. Cantillon defined the entrepreneur as the one who took on business risk 
and took initiative to exploit business opportunities (Hebért and Link 1989). It was in 
connection with the growing dominance of the mathematical approach that the entrepreneur 
was removed from “mainstream economics”. This disappearance has been much noted. Just a 
few of the authors who explore the eradication the entrepreneur, usually indicting modern 
economics for it, include Schumpeter 1942: 86, Baumol 1968, Casson 1982, Barreto 1989, 
Hebért and Link 1982, Kirzner 1973: 26-26, Blaug 1986 (chap. 12), and Machovec 1995. 
  The entrepreneur plays a fundamental role in Austrian, Institutional and 
Schumpeterian theory, theories outside the mainstream paradigm. However, there is no 
universally accepted definition of the entrepreneur or of the entrepreneurial function. Seminal 
contributions have been made by Knight (1921), who defines the entrepreneur as the one who 
takes on genuine uncertainty,
1 and Kirzner (1973, 1997), who defines entrepreneurship as the 
faculty of discovering pure profit opportunities.  
But, perhaps, Schumpeter has had the largest influence on today’s research on 
the role of entrepreneurs. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurs generate and use new knowledge 
about how to better satisfy consumers in more efficient ways, driving economic development. 
He distinguishes between invention (coming up with a novel idea) and innovation (putting the 
invention to work). The entrepreneurial function is realized in innovation, actually introducing 
the invention into the economic system. This function is fundamental. Schumpeter (1934, p 
66) defines five broad categories of innovations: 
(1) The introduction of a new good - that is one with which consumers are not 
yet familiar - or of a new quality of a good.  
(2) The introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means be 
                                                 
1 Risk is defined as a random event with a known distribution, while genuine uncertainty is a random event with 
an unknown distribution. The critical difference is that risk is insurable, while uncertainty is not.  
  4founded upon a discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of 
handling a commodity commercially.  
(3) The opening of a new market, that is a market into which the particular 
branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously entered, 
whether or not this market has existed before.  
(4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-
manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this source already exists or 
whether it has first to be created.  
(5) The carrying out of the new organisation of any industry, like the creation of 
a monopoly position (for example through trustification) or the breaking up of a 
monopoly position. 
 
Schumpeter stresses the importance of the organizational innovations bookkeeping and the 
stock company for the growth of the West. In fact, the more or less spontaneous development 
of private property rights in the West, which laid the foundation for its leading position (e.g. 
North and Thomas 1973; Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986), can be regarded as institutional 
innovations (a subset of organizational innovations). It can be argued that institutional 
innovations are fundamental for technical ones. The actions of the entrepreneurs induce, in 
Schumpeter’s (1942) words, creative destruction; old businesses are challenged by, and 
eventually replaced by, new ones.  
  According to this tradition, the entrepreneur can be seen not only as a factor of 
production, but as the most important factor of production. The reason is that he or she 
allocates all factors of production, including his own energy, attention, and vision, which 
makes it very special (Pelikan 1993). It works as a lever on the rate of return of all factors of 
production.  
  5  The entrepreneurial faculty is scarce and unequally distributed among the 
population, in quantity as well as in quality. Every entrepreneur is boundedly rational, i.e. he 
has a limited capacity to analyze and act on information (Simon 1955, 1990). Important parts 
of the faculty are tacit, impossible to articulate (Polanyi 1967). There are a limited number of 
entrepreneurs who can carry out a limited number of entrepreneurial activities.  
 
B.  Institutions 
 
  It matters whether entrepreneurship is active, and if so, whether it is used 
productively, unproductively or destructively (Baumol 1990, Bhagwati 1982, Murphy et al 
1991). The vitality of entrepreneurship relates directly to our second set of terms: institutions, 
property rights, and economic freedom.   
  Society’s institutions – the rules of the game – largely determine the incentives 
of the entrepreneurs and thereby guide their actions. Private property rights are one of the 
most important institutions. The institutions to a large degree correspond the degree of 
economic freedom, for instance freedom of enterprise, the right for an individual to be an 
entrepreneur at all.  
  The strongest, clearest exponent of institutional theory and the importance of 
economic freedom is probably Adam Smith. The principal policy answer Smith gives to his 
query about the causes of the wealth of nations is economic freedom and the security of 
property rights. Boiled down to a single message, Smithian growth theory says freedom 
causes growth.
2 
  There are many strands of institutional theory in the Smithian vein. Here I 
mention just a few. In the tradition of Ronald Coase, Armen Alchian, and Harold Demsetz, 
                                                 
2 Smith identifies various factors that cause growth, and explains, in terms of other factors, why freedom causes 
growth, and even says that in some exceptional cases freedom should be contravened.  But the main theory is 
that freedom causes growth. 
  6many property-rights economists like Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill interpret economic 
developments with the logic of property rights.  Many economic historians like Robert Higgs 
and Douglass North make property rights and institutions the cornerstones of their historical 
explanations.  Many policy economists like Sam Peltzman do serious empirical research on 
how regulations attenuate property rights and affect activity. Many Austrian, Public Choice, 
and New Institutionalist economists interpret economic topics with the logic of property rights 
and freedom of contract.  These economists use words like property rights and freedom, not 
as policy judgments but as analytic categories.   
  Institutional theory looks upon growth as a process of knowledge creation 
driven by entrepreneurs, whose behavior are conditioned by institutions in general and by 
private property rights in particular (Kasper and Streit 1998). Recent empirical support for the 
importance of institutions comes from the fall of the planned economies and other full-scale 
“experiments” where countries have applied different growth strategies, systematic analyses 
of the question why economic growth does not take off in some developing countries (e.g. De 
Soto 2000), and extensive economic-historical studies (e.g. North and Thomas 1973, 
Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Mokyr 1990).   
 
C. The Duality between the Lacunae 
 
It is no coincidence that dominant mainstream economics has the dual lacunae of 
entrepreneurship and institutions. Equilibrium thinking is essentially a system of 
mathematical functions. The mathematical representation of the theory rests on a number of 
axioms. Barreto (1989) writes:  
The confrontation between the basic axioms and the entrepreneur leaves two 
possibilities: to accept the entrepreneur and reject the modern theory of the firm, 
  7or to reject the entrepreneur and maintain allegiance to the modern theory of the 
firm. . . . Simply put, entrepreneurship is above ‘formalization’ – it cannot be 
neatly packaged within a mechanistic, deterministic model. Importantly, the 
choice is an ‘either-or’ proposition; there is no happy medium. The corner 
solution which economic theory has chosen is consistency and for this reason 
the entrepreneur disappeared from microeconomic theory” (Barreto 1989: 115, 
141). 
 
Analytically, all options are fully specified within a closed system, and the whole terminology 
of property rights is out of place. Entrepreneur-rich and institutional-rich traditions allow for 
actors to come up with creative action, interpretational breakthroughs. In this context, it is 
important to be able to speak of kinds of rules that constrain behavior (rules against stealing, 
for example) yet leave the door open for creative developments. Market entrepreneurship is 
transcendent action within a social framework of property rights. When economics cast its 
fate with equilibrium analysis, it made analysis of both entrepreneurship and institutions 
difficult. 
 
3.  Universities and Textbooks 
 
The investigation covers the 14 economic departments evaluated by Sweden’s National 
Agency for Higher Education (Högskoleverket 2002): Göteborg University, Jönköping 
International Business School, Linköping University, Luleå University of Technology, Lund 
University, Stockholm University, Stockholm School of Economics, Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences (two departments, one in Uppsala and one in Umeå
 ), Umeå University, 
University College of Dalarna, Uppsala University, Växjö University and Örebro University.  
  8  Several departments are too small to give the required courses in 
microeconomics and macroeconomics or courses in industrial organization. The students at 
the small departments are provided with the opportunity to take them at larger departments.
3 
Stockholm School of Economics and Stockholm University have a joint program, Stockholm 
Doctoral Program in Economics, Econometrics and Finance (SDPE). 
  Hence, it is the large universities in Lund, Göteborg, Stockholm, Uppsala and 
Umeå that offer a complete course program. Jönköping also has a complete program. The 
requirements for a Ph.D. degree are similar for the different universities. The requirements 
encompass 160 credits (“points” in Swedish). Each credit is said to correspond to one week of 
full-time studies. With the exception of Lund, the credits are divided entirely between course 
work and writing the dissertation.
4 Generally, the students begin by taking the required 
courses, thereafter the rest of the courses, and finally they write the dissertation.
5  
  Half of the courses, 40 credits, are required: 10 credits in microeconomics, 
macroeconomics, econometrics and mathematics, respectively, except in Lund where 30 
credits are required (10 credits in microeconomics, macroeconomics and econometrics, 
respectively).
6  
  The studies are focused on mainstream economics, which has the natural 
sciences as its model. The theory is expressed in mathematical terms, the analysis is technical, 
and the students are trained in expressing the theory in mathematical form and to solve 
systems of equations. The empirical analysis focuses on econometrics and formal methods. It 
                                                 
3 The University College of Dalarna cooperates with Uppsala University, Linköping University cooperates with 
different universities, Luleå University of Technology cooperates with Umeå University, Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences cooperates with Umeå University and with Uppsala University, and Örebro University 
cooperates with Uppsala University. 
4 In Lund, the courses comprise 70 credits and the writing of the dissertation 90 credits. 
5 In Jönköping, the students start to write the dissertation at the same time they start to read the required courses. 
6 In Lund, there are additional 15 credits in mathematical and statistical methods, which practically all Ph.D. 
students take. Together the 45 credits comprise the core courses. It is also possible for the students in Lund to 
exchange 5 credits in macroeconomics or econometrics for courses more relevant for the dissertation. In 
Jönköping, the obligatory credits in mathematics and macroeconomics are reduced with two credits each to 
create room for a required course in the history of economic thought (4 credits). 
  9generally uses aggregated data and existing data sets. Surveys, case studies and interviews are 
uncommon. The examination of the Ph.D. students and the career of the new Ph.D. depend on 
their ability to command and use the mathematical or econometric techniques. The 
requirements are high and competition is intense. Students can ill afford to pursue socially 
relevant applied research or to participate in or even follow current policy debate (Boschini et 
al 2004).  
  In total, 20 textbooks (different editions are counted as one book) are covered by 
the investigation, covering more than 11,000 pages. The texts are listed in Table 1. A few 
books dominate the education. Mas-Colell et al (1995) is the most commonly used textbook 
in microeconomics and is used in all courses in Micro I as well as in Micro II, Jönköping 
excepted. Varian (1992) is the second most used textbook in microeconomics. Romer 
(different editions), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (different editions) and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996) dominate macroeconomics. Tirole (1989) is the main textbook in industrial 
organization.  Although I have not done a study of Ph.D. programs in the United States, it is 
my strong impression that such programs have these same books as leading texts.  
 
  10Table 1  Universities, courses and textbooks, for academic year 2003-04  
Ph.D. Program  Micro I  Micro II  Macro I  Macro II  I/O 
Lund Gibbons  (1992) 
Mas-Colell et al 
(1995) 
Mas-Colell  et al 
(1995) 




Göteborg  Jehle and Reny 
(1998) 
Mas-Colell et al 
(1995) 
Varian (1992) 
Jehle and Reny 
(1998) 























Stockholm Mas-Colell  et al 
(1995) 
Jehle and Reny 
(2001) 

























Uppsala Mas-Colell  et al 
(1995) 
Varian (1992) 


















Note: Textbooks recommended as useful complementary literature are included. The exception is the course in 
industrial organization in the SDPE, in which several undergraduate textbooks were suggested. Industrial 
organization in Göteborg University was moved to the Fall 2004. The textbook refers to last time the course was 
offered. Macro II in Uppsala University refers to single chapters in other textbooks as literature. Those textbooks 
are not included. Macro I in Umeå University was postponed one year because of a shift in the course program. 
In this case, the textbook refers to the academic year 2002-03. 
 
 
4.  Presence and Meaning: A Vocabulary Analysis  
 
A reference to an expression is counted in the following manner: “Innovation, 64”, one 
reference, “Innovation 64-67”, one reference, “Innovation, 37, 64-67”, two references etc.
7  
                                                 
7 Include all variants, like entrepreneur, entrepreneurial and entrepreneurship.  Several textbooks refer to 
Technological innovation. I have counted technological innovation as innovation. I have also included references 
to process innovation and product innovation under innovation (this applies to Tirole 1989). I have not included 
  11Table 2  Textbooks, concepts, presence, the academic year 2003-04 
Note: Buckley and Michie (1996) is a compilation of articles that does not include any index. It is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. Schmalensee and Willig (1996) is not a textbook but a compilation of papers that 
illuminates particular themes. It is unclear whether it should be included or not, but I chose to include it because 
it contains an index. Several editions of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1999, 2004), Jehle and Reny (1998, 
2001) and Romer (1996, 2001) are used in the courses. The table only shows the latest editions. This does not 
affect the results.  


















654 9  0  9  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Blanchard and 
Fisher (1989) 
650 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Chambers 
(1988) 
331 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Gibbons (1992)  267  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Jehle and Reny 
(2001) 




421 2  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 0 
Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (2000) 
701 1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Luenberger 
(1995) 
486 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 0 
Mas-Colell et al 
(1995) 
981 1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996) 
804 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Pissarides 
(2000) 
252 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 0 
Pollak and 
Wales (1996) 
217 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Romer (2001)  651  5  1  0  0  0  0  0  4  0 




1555 64  0  60  0  3  0  1  0  0 
Stokey and 
Lucas (1989) 
588 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
Tirole (1989)  479  16  0  16  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Walsh (1998)  528  4  0  0  0  0  0  4  0  0 
Varian (1992)  548  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Total:   11,166  105  2  86  0  4  0  5  8  0 
 
  Of the 19 leading textbooks, 16 contain five or fewer references to any of the 
entire set of eight terms.  Eight of the leading textbooks contain no reference to any of them. 
Among the 19 books, only 2 references are made to entrepreneur-, only 5 to institutions, only 
8 to property rights, and not a single reference to economic freedom, invention,
8 or tacit 
                                                                                                                                                          
knowledge, knowledge accumulation, research and development, technical change, technological change or 
technology. I have also excluded terms that may be regarded as synonymous, for instance innovators (one 
reference in Romer 2001), which could be interpreted as a synonym for entrepreneur, because of the 
indeterminacies involved in looking for synonyms.  
8 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) make one reference to invention under the topic of innovation.  They use the 
terms synonymously, so I classify it as innovation. 
  12knowledge.  It is quite obvious that economists have eradicated entrepreneurship and 
institutions from core Ph.D. training. 
  Moreover, in the textbooks where references are made, the references are 
usually few,
9 and the meaning and significance of the ideas are lost, diluted, or distorted, 
compared to the entrepreneurship-rich and institution-rich theories. The reference to 
entrepreneur in Mas-Colell et al (1995) – one of two references made to the concept 
entrepreneur – is speaking. On page 475 the concept entrepreneur is referred to in a question:  
13.C.6 Consider a market for loans to finance investment projects. All 
investment projects require an outlay of 1 dollar. There are two types of 
projects: good and bad. A good project has a probability of pG of yielding profits 
of Π>0 and a probability (1- pG) of yielding profits of zero. For a bad project, 
the relative probabilities are pB and (1- pB) respectively, where pG> pB. The 
fraction of projects that are good is λ ⊆ (0, 1). 
  Entrepreneurs go to banks to borrow the cash to make the initial 
outlay (assume for now that they borrow the entire amount). A loan contract 
specifies an amount R that is supposed to be repaid to the bank. Entrepreneurs 
know the type of project they have, but the banks do not. In the event that a 
project yields profits of zero, the entrepreneur defaults on her loan contract, and 
the bank receives nothing. Banks are competitive and risk neutral. The risk-free 
rate of interest (the rate the banks pay to borrow funds) is r. Assume that ... 
 
The entrepreneur is not mentioned at all in the fundamental function she undertakes in 
Schumpeterian or Kirznerian theory, but could be any borrower at all. The same is true for the 
other reference in Romer (2001: 394-398). The reference is made to Entrepreneur-investor 
                                                 
9 The exception is Schmalensee and Willig (1989) with 60 references to innovation. On the other hand, this 
textbook makes no references to entrepreneur or invention.  
  13contracts, i.e. a loan contract between a borrower (the entrepreneur) and the lender (the 
investor). In this case, it could also apply to any borrower and the entrepreneurial function is 
absent. The reference is made in a chapter entitled Financial-Markets Imperfections, since the 
actors in the model that is developed in the chapter are assumed not to possess perfect 
information. This stands in sharp contrast to the traditions that have a developed theory about 
the entrepreneurial function. These theories, probably most accentuated in the Austrian 
tradition, designate the success of the market economy to its ability to more effectively than 
competing economic systems generate and use new knowledge. It is in the nature of things 
that it is impossible for new knowledge to be available for all people at the same time. It is 
created in individual persons’ brains. The entrepreneurial function is to identify and introduce 
new knowledge into the market, which is disseminated through imitation throughout the 
economic system. The adjustments of the economic actors to the new knowledge lead to 
creative destruction and economic transformation. It is the profits that in a first phase go to the 
entrepreneur that are the driving force behind economic development and economic growth. 
Competition and the process of the market economy may, according to this tradition, be 
compared to a procedure for the discovery and use of new knowledge (Hayek 1937, 1945, 
1978).  
  Bounded rationality is referred to in two books, Laffont and Martimort (2002: 
393) and Schmalensee and Willig (1989: 109-110, 138-139, 170-171). Only the latter uses the 
concept in its original sense.  
  Innovation is referred to in four textbooks and then tantamount to technical 
innovations, caused by research and development.
10 Organizational and institutional 
innovations are absent from the analysis. In traditions focusing on the entrepreneurial 
function, innovations are not driven narrowly by research and development, but by 
                                                 
10 Several of the textbooks make a reference to Research and development and/or Technological innovation 
under the concept innovation. Ljungkvist’s and Sargent’s (2001) reference to innovation is made to in time series 
representation.   
  14entrepreneurs pursuing new business opportunities. Furthermore, the textbooks do not 
distinguish between invention and innovation, which, according to Schumpeterian theory, is 
erroneous. Research and development give raise to inventions, not innovations. It is only 
when an entrepreneur commercializes the invention that it is proper to talk about innovations. 
The distinction has important implications for economic policy. Increased funding to research 
and development need not increase employment and economic growth if commercialization 
mechanisms function poorly, for example because the environment is unfavorable to 
entrepreneurship. In that case, an increased return on research and development can be 
achieved by improving the environment of entrepreneurship, e.g. by decreasing taxes and 
removing restrictions. This can be one explanation of the poor return on investments in 
research and development in Sweden (Henrekson and Rosenberg 2001).  
  Only five textbooks refer to property rights, and in those cases just in passing. 
This is a bit surprising considering the last few decades’ research, especially in economic 
history and in institutional economics, showing that Smith was right about the establishment 
and protection of private property rights as a central factor in economic growth (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al 2001, 2004, Hall and Jones 1999, Mokyr 1990, North and Thomas 1973, 
Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986, Gwartney and Lawson 2004). Moreover, it is not the 
fundamental role of property rights for the working of the economy that are examined. Instead 
such rights are discussed in connection with market failures and external effects, i.e., not the 
general importance of property rights, but only in the case of environmental pollution etc 
(Luenberger 1995: 321, Romer 2001: 36-39 and Varian 1992: 435). Romer (2001: 116, 120, 
121) also discusses property rights in connection with the creation of knowledge. Pissarides 
(2000: 194) mentions property rights in connection with job matching. Laffont’s and 
Martimort’s (2001: 373) reference is only a reference to others.  
  15 The  results  for  institution are similar. Schmalensee and Willig (1989: 63-64) 
mention that institutions strive to reduce transaction costs. Walsh (1998: 160-162, 375-381, 
380-381, 371-375) discusses the institutional set up for governing central banks. No textbook 
discusses institutions in terms of the “rules of the game” of society that govern the actions of 
economic actors and hence affects overall economic performance. The most commonly used 
textbooks in microeconomics (Mas-Colell et al 1995 and Varian 1992) and macroeconomics 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, Obstfeld and Rogoff) do not refer to, for instance, North and 
Thomas (1973), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) or Mokyr (1990) who all, in comprehensive 
and well-known economic-historical studies, show that the economic success and political 
dominance of the Western World is due to the establishment and protection of private 
property rights and other market-conforming institutions.
11, 
12 A book like Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004), entitled Economic Growth, hence, does not make any reference to 
entrepreneurship, institutions, private property rights, or to the economic-historical studies 
that have documented the importance of private property rights and other institutions for long-
run economic growth. Tirole (1989), probably the most used textbook in industrial 
organization in the World, contains no references to entrepreneur, institution or property 
rights.  
  In the 19 books there are many references to Nash equilibrium, Bertrand 
equilibrium, Cournot equilibrium, Concave utility functions, Euler equations etc; concepts 
that on the other hand are not used at all in, e.g., Austrian, Institutional or Schumpeterian 
traditions. In these traditions, the concept of equilibrium is hardly seen as relevant or useful. 
Instead, they emphasize that actors have disjoint knowledge (that is, not merely asymmetric 
information, but asymmetric interpretations), the economy is a dynamic open-ended process 
                                                 
11 North received The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1993.  
12 Romer (2001) refers to North (1981).  




5.  Swedish Reflections on the Problem 
 
There are researchers who worry that today’s Ph.D. programs in economics educate 
researchers unable to identify and analyze economically interesting problems with great 
relevance for society. Assar Lindbeck (2001) wants “two-leg” economists, i.e. economists 
commanding the formal mathematical analysis as well as being able to define and investigate 
interesting issues in an adequate way. Lars Calmfors (1996, p 239-240) is of the opinion that 
the focus on mathematics and statistics makes new researchers untrained in solving real-world 
problems. He sees it as a risk that students interested in real-world problems are not going to 
succeed in the academic competition, being beaten out by those talented in technical crafts 
rather than relevant, meaningful knowledge and analysis. Lennart Erixon (2001, p 317) 
regards this as a problem, not just for the economics profession, but more importantly for 
democracy: “The lack of new generalists is not just an internal problem but also a threat to 
democracy, if it prevents an independent professional elucidation of political decisions with 
great importance for the citizens’ wealth”. 
  Still, many researchers, e.g. both Calmfors and Lindbeck, think that 
mathematics and the training in formal methods provide a good, even necessary, basis for the 
Ph.D. students. Other researchers think otherwise and are of the opinion that it is the 
mathematical model-building dominating today’s research that causes the problem. Professor 
emeritus Erik Dahmén is of the opinion that mathematically oriented economists are 
“prisoners of the tool shed”. Their theory and method make them incapable of defining and 
  17analyzing economically relevant problems; they choose problem according to what their 
mathematical “tool-box” can handle and not according to what is important for society. 
Gunnar Eliasson writes:  
From the classical [equilibrium] model only firms that do not 
belong to this world can be derived. This makes it useless as a 
theoretical foundation for studying management and information 
problems of firms. . . .  I would propose to get the classical model 
removed from organization theory, from the theory of the firm, 
and as a foundation of macroeconomics. (Eliasson 1996: 23, 37) 
 
This investigation implies that the theory underlying all Ph.D. programs in 
economics in Sweden excludes what chiefly explain economic growth and general wealth—
entrepreneurship and private property rights. Then it is not a surprise, but rather natural, that 
the younger generation of economists do not participate more in the public debate. Their 
education is founded on theories and methods often useless in analyzing real-world issues.  
  Researchers who study technological development stress that development is 
carried out within, and are limited by, the design space of individuals from where they “get” 
ideas (Stankiewicz 2000). Similarly, if concepts like entrepreneur and property rights are 
missing in the design space of economists, then those concepts will be excluded from the 
analysis. But is it possible for researchers to describe and analyze, for instance, the progress 
of the furniture industry or the progress of the computer industry, in a credible way, without 
taking account of the entrepreneurs Ingvar Kamprad or Bill Gates and the entrepreneurial 
function they have carried out, manifested in the founding and expansion of IKEA and 
Microsoft? Is it possible to grasp the development of Sweden’s industry excluding the 
inventors and entrepreneurs who once founded and developed the big firms that today 
  18comprise the country’s economic backbone? And in understanding the prominent 
Schumpeterian stories like Kamprad’s IKEA, we come to understand entrepreneurship in the 
general process of economic betterment, including all the small Kirznerian stories. We learn 
something that cannot be learned from a system of equations. Is it possible to analyze total 
employment and economic growth that are the aggregated outcomes of the actions of 
individual persons and firms, without a theory of entrepreneurship? In what way does 
omitting the entrepreneurial function from the analysis influence our understanding of 
enterprising, economic development and economic growth? Schumpeter (1942: 86) famously 
compared leaving the entrepreneur out of economic theory to leaving the Prince of Denmark 
out of Hamlet.  
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
  James Buchanan pointed out the same lacunae in equilibrium economics. In the 
Postscript of What Should Economists Do?, he included these two items in a list of points of 
what economics was failing to get right: 
Economics involves actors. Without actors, there is no play. This truism has 
been overlooked by modern economists whose universe is people with passive 
responders to stimuli. If all are price-takers, who sets price? If all behavior is 
rationally responsive, how can change occur? How can entrepreneurship be 
modeled? Increasingly, I have come to the view that the role of entrepreneurship 
has been the most neglected area of economic inquiry, with significant 
normative implications for the general understanding of how the whole 
economy works.  (Buchanan 1979, p 281; italics in the original) 
 
  19Economics is about a game within rules. Choices are made by actors, by traders, 
constrained within specifically determined ‘laws and institutions,’ a central 
emphasis of Adam Smith and one that has been lost to modern minds. (p. 281-
82) 
 
Buchanan’s assessment of an economics lacking these insights is rather bleak: 
 
I see a continuing erosion of the intellectual (and social) capital that was 
accumulated by ”political economy” in its finest hours. I look at young 
colleagues trained to master regression routines who are totally uninterested in, 
and incompetent to examine, elementary economic propositions. . . . I see them 
compelled to utilize their considerable mental potentials resolving the escapist 
puzzles of modern mathematics. (pp. 279-280) 
 
Inspection of the leading textbooks confirms Buchanan’s remarks. 
  Speaking of industry in Sweden, Erik Dahmén says that the problem is not the 
industry we do have, but the industry we do not have. Similarly, the problem with economics 
education is not the training we do have, but the training we do not have. My conclusion, 
therefore, is that there is a need for economics Ph.D. training based on theories that 
incorporate entrepreneurship and institutions.  
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